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Strategic Rocket Forces (Soviet) 
     Established in 1959 as an extension of the Red Army’s long-range artillery, the 
Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) would become the pre-eminent branch of the Soviet 
nuclear triad, with the land-based component being more important than the 
naval and air branches in terms of resource allocation and prestige.   Early Soviet 
missile force development was heavily influenced by World War II German rocket 
technology and captured German scientists.  A significant part of this early 
development was directed by Sergei Korolev at Scientific Research Institute 88 
near Moscow. 
     The size of these forces grew significantly following the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
which the Soviet leadership saw as a stinging defeat due to their numerical 
inferiority in strategic nuclear weapons.  SRF infrastructural component 
construction, research, and development were influenced by Soviet style 
earmarking, with SS-9 missiles being produced by the Dnepropretovsk Missile 
Design and Production Center in Soviet president Leonid Brezhnev’s regional 
political power base. This enormous governmental financial and political 
commitment to bolstering SRF quality and quantity paid dividends and by the late 
1970s Moscow had probably achieved strategic superiority over U.S. strategic 
nuclear forces. 
     SRF operational facilities were located in various military districts around the 
Soviet Union including Moscow, the Urals, Siberia, Kiev, Belorussia, and Trans-
Baikal.  These weapons were used to threaten tactical, intermediate range targets 
such as NATO forces and populations in Western Europe, and strategic long-range 
targets such as China and the United States.  Specific SRF launch facilities such as 
Kapustin Yar, Plesetsk, and Tyuratam became the targets for U.S. aerial and space 
surveillance and reconnaissance as they sought to determine the quantity and 
quality of Soviet nuclear forces and verify Soviet compliance and particularly non-
compliance with U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. 
     Making accurate estimate intelligence estimates about SRF intentions and 
capabilities was particularly challenging due to the virtual impossibility of U.S. and 
allied intelligence agencies being able to get human agents to successfully 
penetrate and extract reliable information from these highly secret facilities.  
Consequently, the U.S. and its allies were forced to rely on satellite, signals, and 
measurement intelligence to attempt to determine the intentions, quality, and 
quantity of the SRF.  These efforts achieved both success and failure, and their 
accuracy would be the subject of often contentious debate between various 
branches of the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. national security 
policymakers. 
     Weapons produced for SRF by the Soviet defense industry and deployed 
against a global array of targets included the SS-9, deployed in 1967 with a two-
stage liquid propellant engine with a range of at least 10,200 kilometers capable 
of carrying three warheads; the SS-18, with similar capabilities and range whose 
numbers were estimated to be 308 at the Soviet Union’s 1991 collapse; and the 
intermediate range SS-20, deployed between 1976-1988, which was a two-stage 
solid-fuel-propellant carrying three warheads with an operational range of 5,500 
kilometers targeted toward NATO forces and populations in Europe. 
     Soviet strategic planners had to adjust to changes in U.S. nuclear weapons 
development and strategy just as U.S. planners had to adjust to Soviet weapons 
developments and strategy.  The U.S. adoption of counterforce doctrine in 1974 
stressing targeting Soviet military assets with nuclear weapons instead of civilian 
targets was criticized by Brezhnev as threatening Soviet nuclear forces--whose 
parity with U.S. nuclear forces, he believed, was a key foundational basis for 
ongoing Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) arms control negotiations. 
     SRF experienced significant successes in becoming the world’s preeminent 
strategic nuclear power.  The program also experienced failure in the form of the 
bureaucratic stagnation and the lack of quality control incentives inherent in 
centrally planned economies.  The enormous financial investment in SRF and 
overall military spending helped contribute to stagnant and declining economic 
development in civilian Soviet economic sectors.  Arms control treaties with the 
U.S. reduced some of the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Soviet legacy nuclear weapons remain a significant part of the Russian 
Federation’s nuclear deterrent and the presence and possible use of nuclear 
weapons remain significant components in Russian military doctrine two decades 
after the Soviet Union’s collapse. 
                                                                                                        Bert Chapman 
See also: Brezhnev, Leonid Ilyich (1906-1982); Kapustin Yar; Korolev, Sergei 
Pavlovich (1906-1966); SALT I (November 1969-May 1972); SALT II (1972-1979) 
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